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death shall be brought within three years
after the death of the injured person.
The appellants argued that where the
decedent died not knowing that he was a
victim of a wrong and that the wrong had
caused his demise, the beneficiaries should
have up to three years from the time they
knew or should have known the cause of
death, within which to bring an action for
wrongful death. Just such a discovery rule
was established in Harig v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299
(1978), a latent disease case.
The Trimper court distinguished the
Harig case from Trimper, as the former
was brought under MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §5-l0l (1984)
which is the general statute oflimitations
and which provides that an action shall be
filed within three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action. The court in
Harig defined "accrual" as when a plaintiff, "ascertains or through the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence should have
ascertained the nature and cause of his injury." 284 Md. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
The court's definition of accrual was restricted to latent disease cases.
The Trimper court contended that precedent precluded the court from applying a
discovery rule to wrongful death actions.
The rule in Maryland is, that since
the wrongful death statute created a
new liability not existing at common
law, compliance with the period of
limitations for such actions is a condition precedent to the right to maintain
the action. The period oflimitations is
part of the substantive right of action.
305 Md. at 35, citing State v. Zitomer, 275
Md. 534, 542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976), citing
Smith v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 266
Md. 52, 55-56, 291 A.2d 452, 454 (1972);
Dunnigan v. Coburn, 171 Md. 23, 25-26,
187 A. 881, 884 (1936); and State v. Parks,
148 Md. 477, 479-82, 129 A. 793, 795
(1925).
The legislative intent behind the creation of the wrongful death statute is absolutely clear and "there is no room for judicial interpretation." Trimper, 305 Md.
at 36.
Conversely, the survival statutes do not
create a new cause of action unknown to
common law, but merely alter the common law under which certain actions may
be brought on behalf of decedents. The
statute provides that a cause of action at
law, except slander, survives the death of
either party. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §6-401(a) (1984). Limitations on survival actions are provided by
the general statute of limitations.

Appellants, as personal representatives,
relying on Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md.
631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981), which established discovery as the general test for accrual, argued to the court that the survival
claims did not accrue until each woman
knew or should have known of the condition between her husband's exposure to asbestos and the resulting diseases suffered
by the decedents.
In response to this argument, appellees
argued that if no cause of action accrued
until it was discovered after the decedents'
respective deaths, then the decedents had
no cause of action at the time of death and
therefore no action may be brought on behalf of the decedents under the survival
statutes.
The court distinguished Poffenberger
from the case at bar in that the former
never dealt with an injured person who
subsequently died either from the injury
complained of or from other causes without having instituted a right of action for
the injury. Rather, Poffenberger focused
upon the injured person who discovered
the wrong inflicted upon him while living
but after the prescribed three years had expired.
The court also rejected appellees' argument that appellants' claims necessarily fail
if a discovery rule is applied. An injured
party need not know that he has suffered
a legally recognized wrong which has resulted in harm in order to have a complete
cause of action. The court further contended that the discovery rule limits the
period of time in which an injured plaintiff
may bring an action for the wrong committed, "but it does not change the time when
a cause of action becomes conceptually
complete." Trimper, 305 Md. at 42. Accordingly, the court held that the decedents
in these cases have a cause of action which
survive their deaths. The court then turned
to the question of how long the causes of
action exist.
Upon considering a series of case law
dealing with statutory time bars to wrongful death and survival actions, from which
no general principle regarding the same
could be drawn, the court held that survival actions must be brought within three
years of the discovery of a link between the
fatal disease and the exposure to asbestos.
The court explicitly limited the application
of the Qiscovery rule in survival actions to
latent disease cases which are instituted
initially as survival actions rather than
wrongful death actions. The court supported its decision by referring to the
workers compensation statute dealing specifically with latent occupational diseases.
The statute contains a provision whereby
an action for disability or death from pul-

monary dust disease must be brought
within three years from the date of disablement or death or the date on which the employee or his dependent discovered the link
between the disablement or death and his
employment. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§26(a)(4) (1985).
Thus considering the legislative intent
of the wrongful death statute, the discovery
rule established in Harig, and the workers
compensation statute, the Trimper court
concluded that in situations involving the
latent development of disease, a cause of
action accrues either when a person discovers or reasonably should have discovered
the nature and cause of the injury, or at
death whichever first occurs. Judgments
of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
were affirmed.

- Patricia Dart Brooks
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
v.lndianapolis Colts, Inc.: THE
DEMISE OF THE PUBLIC USE
DOCTRINE
In 1982, California acknowledged a sovereign's latent power to condemn a professional sports franchise through eminent domain. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
32 Cal. 3d 60,183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d
835 (1982). Recently in Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Indianapolis Colts,
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D.Md. 1985), the
City of Baltimore sought to test this power
in an attempt to enjoin the Colts football
franchise from relocating to Indianapolis.
Prompted by ailing negotiations between
the City and Colt's owner Robert Irsay,
the Maryland Senate on March 27, 1984
passed emergency legislation authorizing
the City of Baltimore to condemn the Colt's
NFL franchise. In response, Mr. Irsay immediately began shipping all of the team's
physical possessions to Indianapolis. Crews
worked throughout the night of March 28,
and by early morning the loaded Mayflower vans had left Maryland.
On March 30, 1984, the Maryland Legislature finalized Emergency Bill No. 1042,
1984 Md. Laws Ch. 6. Emergency Ordinance No. 32 was thereafter enacted by the
city authorizing the condemnation ofsport
franchises. A condemnation petition was
immediately filed in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City seeking to acquire the Colts
by eminent domain. On April 2, 1984 the
Colts removed the case to the federal district
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
The law of eminent domain authorizes a
sovereign to take property for public use
without the owner's consent upon making
just compensation. Nichol's on Eminent
Domain (3rd ed. 1980) §1.l1 pp. 1-10.
The majority of the case law defining the
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parameters of this power involve a state's
condemnation of tangible property to support traditional and limited public purposes
such as the construction and maintenance
of streets and highways. It is not disputed,
however, that this power extends to encompass property of every kind and character.
26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §73
p.733.
The unique character of this area of the
law demands that the power exercised "be
exclusive of another state's power to condemn the same property." Nichols on Eminent Domain §2.l2. Therefore, acquiring
the Colts through eminent domain required that the club be located within
Maryland at the time condemnation takes
place.
The city's argument was two-fold. First,
although the franchise had long since
moved to Indianapolis, they contended
that the appropriate time to determine the
situs of the club was March 30, 1984, the
date the condemnation petition was filed.
Conceding that the team's physical assets
were not in Maryland on that date, the city
next asserted that the club's "lingering
contacts" with Maryland were enough to
give the city the power to condemn. Colts,
624 F. Supp. at 282.
Thus two major questions were presented
to the court: (1) What is the relevant date
to determine the location of the club? and
(2) What standard is the appropriate test
for determining the situs of intangibles?
The Colts contended that the situs of
property is determined by the date compensation is paid for the property. Article
III §40 of the Maryland Constitution provides: "The General Assembly shall enact
no law authorizing private property to be
taken for public use without just compensation .... being first paid.... " See
also MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§12-102(2), 108 (1981). Further support
for the Colt's position is found in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v.
Nash, 284 Md. 376, 396 A.2d 538 (1979).
In Nash the court of appeals held that a
condemning authority may not interfere
with an owner's right to use and dispose of
his property until it has paid for the property.Id.

The city urged the court to adopt a variation of the "relations back doctrine" applied in City of Crystal Lake v. LaSalle
National Bank, 121 Ill. App. 3d 346, 459
N.E. 2d 643 (1984) and San Bernardino
Valley Municipal Water District v. Gage
Canal Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 206, 37 Cal.

Rptr. 856 (1964). Under this doctrine title
does not vest until the condemnor pays just
compensation, but when payment is made,
the title relates back to the date of the filing
of the condemnation petition. Normally,
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this rule is applied to tax liens or other
rights and obligations which have accrued
after filing. These cases, however, extend
the doctrine to resolve competing claims
for condemnation by adjoining municipalities and determine the rights of the parties
from the date of filing.
Noting that the precedents cited do not
address the issue of intangible property,
the court was nonetheless persuaded that
the statutory framework provided by the
Maryland Legislature makes clear that
"until the condemning authority pays just
compensation, no right to possession is obtained." Colts, 624 F. Supp. at 283.
Accepting arguendo, the application of
the "relation back doctrine" to the instant
case, the court next addressed the issue of
the appropriate standard for determining
situs of an intangible, and three standards
were offered.
First, as the city urged, the power of eminent domain is co-extensive with personal
jurisdiction and therefore the appropriate
standard is the "minimum contacts" analysis established by the Supreme Court in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). However, such a standard
would be unworkable in view of the requirement that a state's power of eminent
domain must be exclusive of another state's
power.
Highly analogous to condemnation, escheat proceedings often involve determining the situs of intangible property. In
such a proceeding, the state takes title to
property abandoned by its owner. In the
late 1940's, the courts utilized the "minimum contacts" analysis to determine situs.

See Connecticut Mutual LIfe Insurance Co. v.
Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948); Standard Oil
v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951). Later

cases abandoned this analysis in favor of a
variation of the concept of mobilia sequuntur
personam (moveables follow the person)
known as the "last known address" rule.
Thus, for escheat purposes, the situs of intangibles is determined by the last known
domicile of the owner. This rule however,
proves to be unworkable as applied to condemnation proceedings. "Unlike escheat
proceedings, where the location of the
owner is usually unknown, condemnation
simply requires the court to determine
where, among two or more possible choices,
the property was located on a given date."
Colts, 624 F. Supp. at 287.
The standard to determine situs in City
of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 673, rested on three factors: the principle place of business; the designated NFL
authorized site for the team's home games;
and the primary locale for the team's tangible property. Id. 183 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
Applying a similar analysis to the instant
case, the court set out three factors which
it had found determinative that the Colts
were not in Maryland on March 30, 1984.
First, the principle place of business was
not in Maryland as no further day-to-day
business was conducted in Maryland after
March 28. Second, the team's essential
tangible property was in Indianapolis by
March 30, 1984. Finally, it was Irsay's intention that the Colts would be outside the
jurisdiction by the time any eminent domain action was filed. Colts, 624 F. Supp.
at 289.

Although this analysis provides an unclear framework to be applied in other condemnation proceedings, the court clearly
requires the condemning authority to have
substantial contacts with the intangible
property before that sovereign's territory
will be deemed as the situs.
The use of eminent domain is restrained
by the requirements of public use and just
compensation. The city's failure to pay just
compensation at a time when the franchise
was located in Maryland obviated the need
for the court to test the basic underlying
assumption upon which their decision
rests. This assumption is that the acquisition of a professional sports franchise constitutes a valid public use.
Maryland has evidenced a clear intent
not to limit the public use doctrine to the
narrow interpretation that a "public use"
means ''use by the public." See Marchant v.
Baltimore, 146 Md. 573, 126 A. 884(1924);

Pt;ince Georges County v. Collington Crossroads, 275 Md. 171,339 A.2d 278 (1975)
(For case law supporting the narrow interpretation see Karesh v. City Council,
271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E. 2d 342 (1978».
However, acceptance of Emergency Bill
No. 1042 and of the views expressed in
City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 183
Cal. Rptr. 673, constitute an unwarranted
and substantial expansion of a sovereign's
power to condemn. The court's decision
implicitly expands the notion of public
use to such an extent that it has become a
meaningless restraint upon the application
of eminent domain.
What then are the implications of a power
so broad as to enable a sovereign to condemn a viable business and justify their
taking upon an obscure belief that they are
indirectly benefiting the public? Indeed, no
one knows where the line is now drawn but
such an unprecedented expansion strikes at
the very heart of our basic property rights
inherent in the United States Constitution.
Until the legislature or the judiciary takes
responsibility for establishing guidelines
and limitations, these rights remain extremely vulnerable.
- Thomas J. Drechsler
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